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Valore: Assuming the Worst

NOTE
Assuming the Worst: Eliminating the
Forcibly Steals Element from Second-Degree
Robbery
State v. Brooks, 446 S.W.3d 673 (Mo. 2014) (en banc).

ROSS VALORE*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of Missouri recently decided two cases dealing with
the troubling distinction between second-degree robbery and stealing.1 The
crimes of second-degree robbery and stealing are distinguished by whether
the defendant uses or threatens the immediate use of physical force in the
commission of the offense.2 After three decades of disagreement within Missouri appellate courts over what standard should be applied when determining
whether the defendant used or threatened the immediate use of physical force,
the Supreme Court of Missouri stepped in to resolve the conflict in the case
of State v. Brooks.3 Unfortunately, the objective standard the court articulated was unclear in its application and will likely cause more confusion in the
lower courts that try to interpret it. In an attempt to resolve the confusion
surrounding the court’s decision in Brooks, this Note attempts to define the
standard articulated by the court, while also looking at alternative ways the
Missouri General Assembly can resolve the conflict between robbery and
stealing.
This Note begins with an exploration of the factual circumstances that
gave rise to the court’s determination that an objective standard should be
applied when determining whether a threat of the immediate use of physical
force exists in second-degree robbery cases. This Note then discusses the
conflict among Missouri appellate courts regarding the determination of
*

B.S., Grand Valley State University, 2011; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri
School of Law, 2016. Senior Note and Comment Editor, Missouri Law Review,
2015–2016. I would like to offer a sincere thank you to Professor Trachtenberg for
his guidance through the learning, writing, and editing process of this Note. I would
also like to thank the Missouri Law Review for its assistance in the writing and editing
of this Note and Brett Favre for continuing to provide me with inspiration each day.
1. See State v. Coleman, 463 S.W.3d 353 (Mo. 2015) (en banc); State v.
Brooks, 446 S.W.3d 673, 674 (Mo. 2014) (en banc).
2. MO. REV. STAT. § 569.030 (2000) (defining second-degree robbery); id. §
569.010(1) (defining stealing).
3. 446 S.W.3d 673.
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whether a threat of force exists, while also looking at how other states have
handled this issue. Next, this Note provides an analysis of the Supreme Court
of Missouri’s reasoning in Brooks and, finally, explores how the objective
standard articulated by the court will be applied, along with a possible alternative solution to the conflict between stealing and robbery in bank theft cases.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On August 25, 2011, Claude Dale Brooks entered a Regions Bank in St.
Charles County dressed in a baggy sweatshirt, baseball hat, sunglasses, and
dreadlocked wig.4 When Brooks arrived at the counter, he handed the bank
teller a note.5 The note read, “Fifties, hundreds, no bait money and bottom
drawer.”6 The bank teller, Angela Ebaugh, typically worked at the drivethrough window, but had moved to the lobby that day because the bank was
busy.7 After reading the note, Ebaugh slowly began to walk away from the
counter to retrieve the money from her drawer near the drive-through window.8 Unsure of what Ebaugh was doing, Brooks slammed his hand on the
counter and told her to “get back here.”9
Brooks then instructed Ebaugh to take the money from her drawer in the
lobby, and Ebaugh explained that there was no money in that drawer and that
she would have to go to the drawer by the drive-through to retrieve the cash.10
Brooks watched intently as Ebaugh walked to the drive-through window,
collected the bills from the bottom drawer, and laid the money on the counter
in front of him.11 Brooks also requested his note back, and Ebaugh complied.12 Brooks then took the money, put it in a shopping bag, and left the
bank.13
Once Brooks exited the bank, Ebaugh signaled the police by putting her
bait bills on the counter.14 When the police arrived, Ebaugh provided a description of Brooks and the events that had taken place at the bank.15 The
police noted that Ebaugh seemed quite nervous and upset.16
4. Appellant’s Substitute Brief at 6, Brooks, 446 S.W.3d 673 (No. SC 94154),
2014 WL 4277591, at *6.
5. Respondent’s Brief at 4, Brooks, 446 S.W.3d 673 (No. SC 94154), 2013 WL
5405170, at *4.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at *5.
9. Id.
10. Id. at *5.
11. Id. at *5–6.
12. Appellant’s Substitute Brief, supra note 4, at *7.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at *8.
16. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 5, at *6.
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Meanwhile, a separate officer also responded to the call and began patrolling the area where Brooks was last seen.17 The officer noticed Brooks
walking down the sidewalk on a street near the bank, but he did not have
dreadlocks or a hat as the description provided.18 Nevertheless, the officer
stopped Brooks to ask him whether he had seen anyone matching the description the officer provided.19 Brooks replied that he saw someone matching
that description running in the area and told the officer what direction he was
heading.20 While questioning Brooks, the officer noticed that he appeared to
be nervous and out of breath, and as Brooks began to walk away, the officer
told him to stop.21 Brooks ignored the officer’s request, and after the officer
told him to stop a second time, Brooks began running.22
The officer notified the patrol officer in the area that the suspect was
running in his direction, and the second officer stopped Brooks and put him
in handcuffs.23 Upon searching Brooks, the officer found a brown plastic bag
with money inside that matched the amount Ebaugh believed was stolen from
the bank.24 Shortly after Brooks was placed under arrest, the dreadlocked
wig and baseball hat were found in a storm drain nearby.25
Brooks was charged with robbery in the second degree.26 In a bench trial, Brooks admitted to stealing money from the bank, but he denied committing a robbery in the second degree, arguing that he did not use or threaten the
use of immediate physical force.27 A person commits robbery when, “in the
course of stealing, . . . he uses or threatens the immediate use of physical
force upon another person.”28 Based on this argument, Brooks moved for
acquittal at the close of the evidence.29 The trial court denied the motion and
found Brooks guilty of robbery in the second degree.30 The trial court reasoned that “his disguise, the note he handed the teller, his unusual knowledge
of bank procedure, and the gesture of slamming his hand down on the bank
counter ‘show[ed] . . . an actual immediate threat of physical force.’”31 The
trial court handed down a twenty-five-year sentence to Brooks, classifying

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Appellant’s Substitute Brief, supra note 4, at *8.
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 5, at *6.
Id.
Appellant’s Substitute Brief, supra note 4, at *8.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *8–9.
Id. at *9.
Id.
State v. Brooks, 446 S.W.3d 673, 674 (Mo. 2014) (en banc).
Id. at 674–75.
MO. REV. STAT. § 569.010(1) (2000).
Brooks, 446 S.W.3d at 674–75.
Id. at 675.
Id.
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him as a prior and persistent offender because of his two previous federal
bank robbery convictions.”32
Brooks appealed this decision to the Missouri Court of Appeals for the
Eastern District, which, in a 2-1 decision, vacated Brooks’s conviction for
robbery in the second degree.33 In making its decision, the appellate court
relied on Patterson v. State, which states that the use of force “may be implied from the fact that the defendant displayed a weapon, engaged in behavior that gave the appearance that he was armed, or used [a] phrase[] like,
‘This is a holdup.’”34 The appellate court reasoned that because Brooks had
not threatened physical force, had no weapon, and did nothing to indicate that
he had a weapon, there was no affirmative act, beyond stealing, that justified
his conviction for second-degree robbery.35 The dissenting opinion found the
majority’s articulation of what constituted an affirmative act too narrow and
reasoned that Brooks’s knowledge of bank procedure, disguise, note, and
slamming of his hand on the counter was sufficient evidence that Brooks’s
actions constituted a threat of physical force.36
On transfer, the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the trial court’s
ruling that Brooks’s actions constituted a threat of immediate physical force
and that he was correctly convicted of second-degree robbery.37 The court
relied on United States v. Gilmore, which held that a demand for money in a
bank was an “implicit threat of the use of force in and of itself.”38 The court
held that Brooks’s disguise, the note, slamming his fist on the counter and
telling Ebaugh to “get back here,” along with his apparent knowledge of bank
procedure, was sufficient to cause a reasonable person to infer that Brooks
would use immediate physical force if his demands were not met.39

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Over the past three decades, Missouri courts have struggled to distinguish what constitutes an immediate threat of physical force in second-degree
robbery cases where the defendant does not make physical contact with the
victim or use verbal threats. Some courts have held that simply stealing from
a bank or a store is sufficient to find a threat of force,40 while other courts
have required that the defendant engage in an affirmative threatening act to
32. Id.
33. State v. Brooks, No. ED99427, 2014 WL 606526, at *5 (Mo. Ct. App. Feb.

18, 2014), aff’d, 446 S.W.3d 673.
34. Id. at *4 (alterations in original) (quoting Patterson v. State, 110 S.W.3d 896,
904 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003)).
35. Id.
36. Id. at *5–7 (Gaertner, J., dissenting).
37. Brooks, 446 S.W.3d at 677.
38. Id. at 676 (citing United States v. Gilmore, 282 F.3d 398, 402 (6th Cir.
2002)).
39. Id. at 677.
40. Id. at 676.
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satisfy this element.41 This Part will first cover the different definitions of
threat of force, then how Missouri courts have interpreted threat of force in
the past, and finally, how other states have interpreted threat of force in robbery cases.

A. Defining “Threat of Force”
Second-degree robbery is defined as the “forcible stealing of property.”42 Forcible stealing occurs when a person “‘in the course of stealing . . .
uses or threatens the immediate use of physical force upon another person for
the purpose of’ either defeating resistance to the theft or compelling the surrender of the property.”43 The crimes of second-degree robbery and stealing
are distinguished by whether the defendant uses or threatens the immediate
use of physical force in the commission of the offense.44 Unfortunately, the
statute does not go on to define what a threat of force is, and there is not any
legislative commentary to offer guidance.45
As a result of this lack of guidance, there was considerable disagreement
regarding how the threat of force is determined when the defendant does not
verbally threaten or make physical contact with the victim. Some courts have
used an objective standard as, “whether a reasonable person would believe
[the defendant’s] conduct was a threat of the immediate use of physical
force.”46 Under this standard, the trier of fact uses the victim’s and witness’s
testimony, along with other circumstantial evidence, to determine whether a
reasonable person would believe the defendant’s conduct constituted an immediate threat of physical force.47
A second approach looks at whether the defendant engaged in any affirmative conduct that exhibits a threat of immediate physical force.48 A recent Missouri decision, State v. Coleman, reasoned that a victim’s objectively
reasonable fear is not enough, as there “must be some affirmative conduct on
the part of the defendant, beyond the mere act of stealing, which communicates that he will immediately employ ‘physical force’ if the victim resist[s] . .
. the taking of the property.”49
41. State v. Coleman, No. WD 76520, 2014 WL 4815414, at *4 (Mo. Ct. App.
Sept. 30, 2014), aff’d, 463 S.W.3d. 353 (Mo. 2015) (en banc).
42. MO. REV. STAT. § 569.030 (2000).
43. Brooks, 446 S.W.3d at 675 (quoting § 569.010.1).
44. Robert H. Dierker, Crimes Against Persons, 32 MO. PRAC., MISSOURI
CRIMINAL LAW § 21.3 (2d ed. 2015).
45. § 569.030; see also State v. Applewhite, 771 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Mo. Ct. App.
1989) (“Our statutes do not define the term ‘force’ itself nor do they define the quantum of ‘force’ necessary to constitute forcible stealing.”).
46. Brooks, 446 S.W.3d at 676.
47. See id.
48. State v. Coleman, No. WD 76520, 2014 WL 4815414, at *4 (Mo. Ct. App.
Sept. 30, 2014), aff’d, 463 S.W.3d 353 (Mo. 2015) (en banc).
49. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 569.010 (2000)).
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A third approach is one taken by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit when prosecuting under the federal bank robbery statute.50
The Bank Robbery and Incidental Crimes statute altered the typical language
of robbery statutes by adding intimidation to the types of threats defendants
could make in order to avoid the “incongruous results” that would commonly
arise when the defendant would not use or threaten force during the commission of the crime and, therefore, would not be liable under the statue for robbery.51 Taking by intimidation is defined as “the willful taking in such a way
as would place an ordinary person in fear of bodily harm.”52 In interpreting
this statute, courts have consistently rejected the argument that affirmative
threats of bodily harm, threatening body signals, or the possibility of a concealed weapon are required to establish bank robbery under the federal statute.53

B. How Threat of Force Has Been Interpreted in Missouri
There has been a significant split in Missouri courts in determining what
constitutes a threat of force in second-degree robbery cases. Appellate courts
across the state have applied confusing and often contradictory reasoning
when determining what constitutes a threat of force, resulting in differing
outcomes – depending on which court hears the case. The following cases
illustrate the confusion.
In State v. Carter, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District
overturned a conviction for second-degree robbery, finding there was no
force or threat of force used when the defendant reached into the victim’s
pocket and took her purse.54 In Carter, the victim and her grandson were
walking to their car in a Family Dollar parking lot when the defendant approached the victim and started asking questions about her grandson.55 When
the victim turned her back to enter her vehicle, the defendant said, “Give me
your purse,” and the defendant held out his hand.56 The victim then instructed the defendant to take the purse out of her coat pocket, and the defendant
reached into her coat pocket, took the purse, and ran away.57 The court reasoned that the evidence was insufficient to show the defendant used or threatened to use physical force against the victim sufficient for a second-degree

50. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2012).
51. See C. T. Drechsler, Validity and Construction of Federal Bank Robbery Act,

59 A.L.R.2d 946 § 2(b) (1958).
52. United States v. Bingham, 628 F.2d 548, 548 (9th Cir. 1980).
53. Coleman, 2014 WL 4815414, at *7 n.7 (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
54. 967 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
55. Id. at 308.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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robbery conviction, because the defendant had no weapon and did not harm
or threaten the victim.58
In State v. Tivis, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District
reversed a conviction for second-degree robbery because the defendant did
not threaten the immediate use of physical force when stealing a purse from
the victim.59 In Tivis, the defendant approached the victim as she was unloading her groceries from her car and asked if she was interested in purchasing a stuffed pumpkin.60 The victim declined, and the defendant continued to
follow the victim to her apartment door, where he “yanked” the purse off her
shoulder and ran off.61 The victim testified that the defendant did not threaten her, there was no struggle when the purse was taken, and the defendant
took the purse by the strap and did not touch her.62 In overturning the conviction for second-degree robbery, the appellate court noted that the only evidence of a threat of force was the defendant yanking the purse from the victim’s shoulder, but the defendant made no contact with the victim, and there
was no struggle.63 The court reasoned that there was no “evidence in the case
at bar of the use or threatened use of immediate physical force” and overturned the conviction for second-degree robbery.64
In State v. Clark, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District
affirmed a conviction for second-degree robbery because a note the defendant
handed to the victim was reasoned to be a threat to use immediate force.65 In
Clark, the defendant entered a fast food restaurant and handed the cashier a
note that read, “This is a holdup. Give me all the money in the register.”66
The cashier took the bills out of the register and laid them on the counter, and
the defendant grabbed them and ran out of the restaurant.67 The defendant
appealed his conviction for second-degree robbery, arguing that he did not
use or threaten to use force on the victim.68 The court noted in its opinion
that there were no Missouri cases that had dealt with the issue of whether a
defendant threatens to use immediate force when he hands the victim a note
but engages in no other threatening behavior.69 The court relied on reasoning
applied by a court in Pennsylvania, which found that “[t]he expression
‘holdup,’ in its ordinary significance, means a forcible detention of the person
held with the intent to commit robbery and implies the necessary force to

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 309.
884 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 29.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 30.
Id.
790 S.W.2d 495, 497 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
Id. at 495–96.
Id. at 496.
Id. at 495.
Id. at 497.
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carry out that purpose.”70 Applying this reasoning, the court held that the
defendant’s note satisfied the element of forcibly steals in that the note was
intended to cause an immediate threat of force so that the cashier would give
the defendant the money in the register.71
In State v. Henderson, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern
District reversed a conviction for second-degree robbery where the defendant
brushed the arm of the victim when grabbing money from the cash register. 72
In Henderson, the defendant entered a convenience store, took a drink from
the cooler, and went to the clerk and handed her a five-dollar bill.73 When the
clerk opened the cash register, the defendant jumped over the counter and
grabbed the money out of the register and, in the process, “kind of brushed”
the clerk’s arm, which caused her to jump back.74 In reasoning that the defendant did not use force, the court stated that the brush amounted to “de minimus [sic] contact incidental to the money snatch” and was not a threat or use
of force.75
In State v. Coleman, a majority for the Missouri Court of Appeals for
the Western District reversed the conviction for second-degree robbery of a
defendant who told a bank teller to put money in a bag because the defendant
engaged in no affirmative action which suggested immediate force or the
threat of force.76 In Coleman, the defendant entered a bank wearing sunglasses and walked directly to the teller, leaned forward with his arms on the
counter, and told her, “I need you to do me a favor. Put the money in this
bag.”77 The defendant handed the teller a bag, and while the teller was putting the money in the bag, another employee approached the defendant.78
The defendant told the employee, “Ma’am, stop where you are and don’t
move any farther.”79 The employee obeyed the defendant’s instructions, the
teller handed the defendant the bag of money, and the defendant then swiftly
left the bank.80
The majority in Coleman relied on the reasoning of Tivis, which the
court interpreted to mean that a conviction for second-degree robbery requires
that the defendant “communicated, through affirmative conduct and/or words,
an intent to immediately use physical force if the victim fails to deliver up the

70. Id. (quoting Brown v. State, 397 So.2d 1153 (Fla. App. 1981) (citing State v.
Anderson, 101 P. 198, 200 (1909)).
71. Id.
72. 310 S.W.3d 307, 309 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010).
73. Id. at 307.
74. Id. at 307–08.
75. Id. at 309.
76. No. WD 76520, 2014 WL 4815414, at *4 (Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2014),
aff’d, 463 S.W.3d 353 (Mo. 2015) (en banc).
77. Id. at *1.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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property or otherwise resists his taking of the property.”81 The Tivis opinion,
summarized above, does not include the phrase “affirmative conduct,” which
makes the reasoning applied by a majority of the Western District especially
novel.82 The court in Coleman went on to explain the need for the affirmative
conduct element by reasoning that “then virtually all stealing other than by
means of deceit will be the same as robbery in the second degree.”83 By not
enforcing the physical threat element of robbery in the second degree, the
court would render the robbery in the second-degree statute superfluous.84
Following this logic, the majority determined that the defendant’s words did
not imply a threat of force and that his body language did not indicate that he
possessed a weapon or had any intention to attack.85
The dissent in Coleman argued that the majority incorporated a mens rea
of “purposely” into both the conduct and result elements of the second-degree
robbery statute, where the mens rea should only apply to the result element of
the crime or to the “obtaining of property against the will of another.”86 Further, the dissent argued that the objective standard – whether a reasonable
person would conclude that the defendant engaged in conduct that threatened
the immediate use of physical force – should have been used.87 The dissent
concluded that a reasonable fact finder could find that the defendant’s objective was to have the teller deliver the money, and that a bad result would occur if she did not.88
The Supreme Court of Missouri granted review and upheld Coleman’s
conviction for second-degree robbery.89 Coleman attempted to distinguish
his case from Brooks, arguing that he did not “make any threatening physical
gestures or raise his voice in a threatening manner.”90 In holding that Coleman’s actions constituted an implicit threat of force, the court reiterated the
objective standard announced in Brooks,91 and that a demand for money in a
bank is an “implicit threat of the use of force in and of itself.”92 Further, the
court dismissed Coleman’s argument that Brooks should be overturned because it stands for the proposition that all thefts from a bank would constitute

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at *3 (citing State v. Tivis, 884 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)).
See generally Tivis, 884 S.W.2d at 28.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id.
Id. at *7.
State v. Coleman, 463 S.W.3d 353, 355 (Mo. 2015) (en banc).
Id. at 354–55.
See State v. Brooks, 446 S.W.3d 673, 676 (Mo. 2014) (en banc) (“[T]he
existence of a threat depends on whether a reasonable person would believe [the defendant’s] conduct was a threat of the immediate use of physical force, which is an
objective test.”).
92. Coleman, 463 S.W.3d at 355.
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second-degree robbery.93 The court stated that “neither Brooks nor this case
holds that all thefts of money from a bank necessarily involve forcible stealing and, therefore, constitute robbery. Instead, these cases recognize that
context matters.”94 The court reasoned that a theft from a bank would raise a
“strong implication of a threat,” but the facts of each case would ultimately
determine whether it constituted a threat or implied threat of the use of
force.95

C. How Other States Interpret Threat of Force in Robbery Cases
Other states have faced similar problems in trying to articulate what
constitutes a threat of force when a victim of robbery is not touched or verbally threatened. There seems to be a pattern, and it appears in Missouri cases as well, that while appellate courts tend to find that force or the threat of
force was not present in close cases, trial and state supreme courts are more
likely to find the defendant’s conduct was sufficient for a conviction of second-degree robbery. The following cases exhibit the uncertainty that courts
face when trying to determine if a defendant has used or threatened physical
force when the victim has not been touched or verbally threatened.
In People v. Taylor, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the decision of
the appellate court, which vacated the robbery conviction of a defendant who
stole a necklace off a victim without touching her.96 The Illinois Supreme
Court reasoned that the necklace was attached to the victim, and removing it
from her neck required force.97 In Taylor, the defendant approached the victim while she was talking on a payphone, snatched the necklace off of her
neck, and then stared at her for an uncomfortable period before running
away.98 Illinois defines robbery as the taking of property from the “person or
presence of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of
force.”99 In finding the defendant guilty of robbery, the court distinguished
the taking of a necklace off of a person from the taking of a purse off of a
shoulder, reasoning that when an item is “attached to the person of the victim
in such a manner as to create a resistance to its taking,” it is sufficient to find
the element of force.100 Interestingly, the court here did not find the defendant used constructive force or the threat of force, but that the taking of the
necklace constituted actual force.101

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id.
Id.
591 N.E.2d 677, 680 (Ill. 1989).
Id.
Id. at 678.
Id. at 678–79 (quoting ILL. COMP. STAT. 1983 / 18-1(a) (West 2016)).
Id. at 681.
Id.
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In State v. Collinsworth, the Washington State Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction for second-degree robbery of a defendant who robbed
seven different banks using a similar method of demanding money from the
teller, but using no force or verbal threats.102 In Collingsworth, the defendant
would enter banks wearing baggy clothing and directly approach the teller,
telling her some variant of “I need your hundreds, fifties and twenties,” and
“No bait, no dye.”103 The teller in each scenario gave the money to the defendant and testified to feeling threatened, even though no weapon was
shown or indicated.104 Washington has a similar second-degree robbery statute to Missouri; it requires the State prove that the defendant took the money
“by the use or threatened use of immediate force, violence, or fear of injury.”105
The court noted that no previous Washington case had decided whether
a defendant who does not use threating language or actual force is liable for
robbery, so the court relied on decisions interpreting the federal bank robbery
statute.106 The federal bank robbery statute criminalizes the “taking of property from a bank ‘by force and violence, or by intimidation.’”107 Following
cases interpreting the federal statute, the court reasoned that the literal meaning of the words used by the defendant, although non-threating, were “fraught
with the implicit threat to use force,” and that any threat, no matter how insignificant, which causes a person to hand over their property is “sufficient to
sustain a robbery conviction.”108

IV. INSTANT DECISION
The issue in Brooks was whether handing the bank teller a non-threating
note, banging his fist on the counter, and having an apparent knowledge of
bank procedure was sufficient to find that Brooks threatened the immediate
use of physical force necessary for a second-degree robbery conviction.109
Brooks argued on appeal that he did not threaten force because he had no
weapon, did not engage in any behavior that gave the appearance that he had
a weapon, and did not use threatening language during the theft.110 Judge Zel
M. Fischer wrote the unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court of Missouri,
which held that Brooks’s actions did constitute an immediate threat of physical force and affirmed Brooks’s conviction of second-degree robbery.111
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

966 P.2d 905, 908–09 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 905–06.
Id. at 906.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.56.190 (West 2016).
Collinsworth, 966 P.2d at 907–08.
Id. at 907 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2012)).
Id. at 908.
State v. Brooks, 446 S.W.3d 673, 675 (Mo. 2014) (en banc).
Id.
Id. at 674, 677.
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The court began its analysis by outlining the authority Brooks used to
support his contention that he did not threaten the use of force.112 The court
first identified Patterson, where the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District articulated several factual scenarios Missouri courts should look
to when determining whether the defendant threatened force.113 These factors
include the presence of a weapon or behavior that would indicate the defendant had a weapon and the use of phrases such as “[t]his is a holdup” or
“stickup.”114 The court also noted Brooks’s use of Tivis,115 where the Western District held that there was not a threat of force sufficient for a conviction
of second-degree robbery when the defendant yanked a purse off of the victim’s shoulder.116
The court then looked to the authority provided by the State to support
its primary argument that Brooks’s actions constituted a threat of immediate
physical force. The court first identified State v. Rounds, where the Missouri
Court of Appeals for the Eastern District held that a defendant who had a
hand in his pocket, implying he had a weapon, and who also told the victim
not to “be a hero . . . or [the defendant] was going to blow [the victim’s] head
off,” was sufficient evidence of a threat of immediate physical force.117 More
on point, the court also noted the State’s use of State v. Duggar, where the
Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern District held that a defendant
threated force because he “had a firm purpose, an unusual knowledge of the
internal security system in the cash register, and a hand concealed in his jacket,” which gave the appearance he was armed.118
Further, the court referenced cases the State used to support its secondary argument that Brooks’s actions created the “inference of a threat of immediate harm because he put the victim in fear.”119 In State v. Lybarger, the
Western District reasoned that the defendant telling the victim, “This is a
robbery,” while keeping his hand in his pocket, implied he had a gun and was
sufficient evidence for a finding of an inference of a threat of immediate
harm.120 Lastly, the court noted Applewhite, where the Eastern District held
that a defendant who pushed a store employee as he fled the robbery had giv-

112. Id. at 675.
113. Brooks, 446 S.W.3d at 675 (citing Patterson v. State, 110 S.W.3d 896 (Mo.

Ct. App. 2003)).
114. Id. (quoting Patterson, 110 S.W.3d at 904–05).
115. State v. Tivis, 884 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
116. Brooks, 446 S.W.3d at 675–76.
117. Id. at 676 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Rounds, 796 S.W.2d 84,
86 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)).
118. Id. (quoting State v. Duggar, 710 S.W.2d 921, 922 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)).
119. Id.
120. Id. (quoting State v. Lybarger, 165 S.W.3d 180, 186–87 (Mo. Ct. App.
2005)).
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en the inference of a threat of immediate harm sufficient for a finding of second-degree robbery.121
The court then articulated the standard used to determine the existence
of a threat of force as “whether a reasonable person would believe his conduct was a threat of the immediate use of physical force.”122 In determining
that Brooks did create an implicit threat of force, the court placed particular
emphasis on the setting where the theft occurred.123 The court reasoned that
banks are “regular targets of robberies, and their employees have a heightened awareness of security threats. A demand for money in that context is an
implicit threat of the use of force in and of itself.”124 The court supported this
reasoning by citing a U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit case, United
States v. Gilmore, where the defendant was prosecuted under the federal bank
robbery statute, which requires that the crime take place in a “bank, credit
union, or any savings and loan association.”125
Looking to the facts of the case, the court noted Brooks’s use of a wig,
cap, and sunglasses as evidence of his “clear purpose to steal money.”126 The
court found the threat of force to become immediate when Brooks handed the
teller the note that demanded money.127 Further, when Brooks slammed his
fist on the counter, which the court noted was forceful enough to startle the
other tellers, this could also be considered a threat of the use of immediate
physical force.128 Then, when the teller walked away to retrieve the money,
Brooks continued to watch her closely, which the court interpreted as a warning to the teller that Brooks understood bank procedure and would know if
she did anything to alert the police.129 The court found that a reasonable inference was that Brooks’s actions exhibited a threat of immediate physical
force if the teller did not obey Brooks’s commands.130
Finally, the court applied the objective standard for a threat: “[W]hether
a reasonable person would believe his conduct was a threat of the immediate
use of physical force.”131 Intriguingly, the court applied this standard by looking at how the teller reacted to Brooks’s actions, as opposed to whether a
reasonable person in Brooks’s shoes would believe his conduct induced a
threat as the standard states.132 Reasoning that the victim “felt threatened,”
121. Id. (citing State v. Applewhite, 771 S.W.2d 865, 867–68 (Mo. Ct. App.

1989)).
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Gilmore, 282 F.3d 398, 402–03 400 (6th Cir.
2002)); Gilmore, 282 F.3d at 400 n.1 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2012)).
126. Brooks, 446 S.W.3d at 676–77.
127. Id. at 677.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 676.
132. Id. at 677.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

13

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 24

322

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

the court held that Brooks “implicitly threatened the use of immediate physical force,” and his conviction of second-degree robbery was affirmed.133

V. COMMENT
The difficulty in determining whether a defendant threatened the immediate use of physical force is reflected in the inconsistent outcomes that Missouri courts have reached in second-degree robbery cases over the past three
decades. The Supreme Court of Missouri has apparently sensed the confusion that trial and appellate courts are operating under and has taken on transfer of two second-degree robbery cases dealing with the threat of force in the
past year.134 It appears the court is attempting to define a uniform standard
by which Missouri courts should measure the threat of force, and the standard
appears to be quite prosecutor-friendly.
This Part begins by explaining the significance between being convicted
of second-degree robbery and stealing, then examines the standard applied in
Brooks, followed by a discussion of an alternative solution to the problem of
determining whether a defendant threatened force when taking money from a
bank.

A. Why the Difference Between Second-Degree Robbery and Stealing
Matters
For a criminal defendant, the difference between being convicted of
second-degree robbery and stealing is more than just a matter of semantics.
In 2013, only eighteen percent of defendants convicted of stealing (value
$150 or more) were sentenced to time in prison, and those who were given
prison time where given an average sentence of only 4.4 years.135 However,
fifty-three percent of defendants convicted of second-degree robbery were
required to serve time in prison and were sentenced to an average of 8.7 years
in prison.136 With the average prison sentence for second-degree robbery
almost twice that of stealing, it is crucial that the Supreme Court of Missouri
articulate a clear standard for examining a threat of force so that criminal
defendants and their attorneys are able to present their best argument at trial.

B. Defining the Standard
The problem with the standard articulated by the court in Coleman is
that it is not entirely clear from whose perspective the threat is being evaluated – the victim or the defendant. The standard, as the Supreme Court of Mis133. Id.
134. Id. at 673; State v. Coleman, 463 S.W.3d 353 (Mo. 2015) (en banc).
135. MO. SENTENCING ADVISORY COMM’N, USER GUIDE 2012–2013, at 44 (Apr.

26, 2013), http://www.mosac.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=45394.
136. Id. at 37.
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souri articulated it, is “whether a reasonable person would believe his conduct
was a threat of the immediate use of physical force.”137 The plain meaning of
this standard seems to be whether a reasonable defendant would believe his
conduct would be perceived as a threat. However, contrary to the literal reading of the standard, the court applied the standard as whether a reasonable
person in the victim’s position would feel threatened by the defendant’s conduct.138 For example, in applying the standard, the court looked at whether a
reasonable teller would interpret Brooks’s disguise as a threat,139 whether the
teller would feel threatened by Brooks watching her as she got the money, 140
and whether Brooks banging his hand on the counter would be perceived as a
threat.141 Thus, in application, the court is actually applying a different
standard than the one articulated in Brooks. Of course, instituting an objective standard has appeal when trying to determine something as subjective as
a threat, where a statement that might be perceived as a threat to some people
would not be interpreted as a threat by others. However, by creating an ambiguous standard, the court has not resolved the confusion surrounding the
threat of force in second-degree robbery cases.
Assuming the standard the court intended to articulate was whether a
reasonable person would interpret the words or actions of the defendant as a
threat, the court set a low bar for prosecutors to prove that the defendant’s
actions constituted a threat of the immediate use of physical force. The reason the bar is lower for prosecutors under the new standard is that it is inherent in an act of stealing that a reasonable person would feel threatened by any
action that the defendant takes, whether or not their conduct implies the immediate use of physical force. For example, the court reasoned in Brooks that
by Brooks slamming his hand forcefully on the counter, of which the forcefulness was a matter of factual dispute,142 the teller “[n]aturally . . . felt ‘terrified’ and that she ‘had to follow through with the note to keep [her] coworkers and [her] self safe.’”143 The court acknowledged that Brooks did not
use any threatening language or physical mannerisms during the theft other
than the hand slap,144 so it hardly seems determinative that a hand slap alone
would cause someone to fear the immediate use of physical force.
The crucial factor that was not contemplated in the court’s standard is
that this theft took place in a bank, a unique factual setting that distinguishes
it from many other robberies. Instead, the court noted that banks are a regular
target for robberies, and bank employees have a “heightened awareness of

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Brooks, 446 S.W.3d at 676.
Id. at 677.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Appellant’s Substitute Brief, supra note 4, at *6; Respondent’s Brief,
supra note 5, at *6.
143. Brooks, 446 S.W.3d at 677 (alterations in original).
144. Id. at 675, 677.
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security threats.”145 In fact, the court placed such emphasis on the location of
the theft in its reasoning that it stated, “[a] demand for money in [a bank] is
an implicit threat of the use of force in and of itself.”146 The court is essentially stating that any theft that occurs in a bank while customers or employees are present is necessarily an implicit threat of force, regardless of whether
the defendant acts in a threatening manner or not. As a result, the Brooks
standard and reasoning contemplates an act of stealing that takes place in a
bank and ignores how this lenient standard will affect those defendants
charged with second-degree robbery outside of the bank context.

C. Bank Robbery Statute
A solution to the outcome in Brooks would be for the Missouri legislature to enact a separate bank robbery statute that removes the force or threat
of force element, while maintaining the traditional forcible stealing element
for thefts that occur outside of a bank or financial institution. Rather than
focus on whether the party who steals from a bank uses or threatens force, the
statute would penalize stealing147 and robbery the same, thereby eliminating
the need to find force in order to convict under the statue. This seems to be
what the court was suggesting in Brooks, as it relied heavily on cases applying the federal bank robbery statute,148 which includes both stealing and robbery as alternative conduct elements for the crime. Further, enacting a statute
that specifically punishes bank robbery would also be significant for the public policy it encourages: if you steal or attempt to steal from a bank, there will
be a harsh punishment, regardless of whether force is threatened, due to the
inherent security risks that accompany that crime.
One significant benefit of having a state statute specifically for bank
robbery is that it can punish anyone who steals from a bank uniformly, as
opposed to the problematic system of trying to determine whether the defendant committed second-degree robbery or stealing. For example, Michigan
has enacted a bank robbery statute that finds a person guilty of bank robbery
if he or she commits the crime of stealing or robbery, or has the intent to
commit robbery or stealing from a bank.149 Including the intent to commit
the crime of stealing or robbery in the statute further removes the need to
focus on the use of force in the crime. Rather, the use of force is treated as a
determinative factor in the sentencing of the crime, where the sentence is
harsher if force was used in the commission of the robbery.150

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 676.
Id.
MO. REV. STAT. § 570.030 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
Brooks, 446 S.W.3d at 677.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.531 (West 2016).
See id.
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The federal government has also enacted a specific bank robbery statute,
as alluded to in the Brooks decision.151 Similar to the statute enacted in
Michigan, the federal statute makes it a criminal offense to even enter a bank
with the intent to commit stealing or robbery.152 The federal statute was originally limited to robbery, but expanded the statute to include stealing due to
the “incongruous results” that would commonly arise when the defendant
would not use or threaten force during the commission of the crime and therefore not be liable under the statue for robbery.153 Also like the Michigan statute, the federal statute imposes higher penalties for anyone who attempts to
steal from a bank and puts someone’s life in danger in the process, allowing
punishment up to and including the death penalty if someone is killed during
the commission of the offense.154
A possible criticism of enacting a state bank robbery statute could be
that there is not a substantive difference between robbery of a bank and robbery of a person on the street that merits separate standards. Admittedly, all
types of robbery pose significant threats to the victim’s safety, regardless of
the location of the act. However, the robbery of a bank is inherently more
dangerous, as there are typically armed security guards, customers, and a
number of employees the defendant has to communicate with to retrieve the
money or property they demand. For example, there were 3972 reported
robberies and larcenies committed at banks and financial institutions across
the United States in 2014.155 During the commission of those offenses, sixtythree people were injured, and an additional thirteen were killed.156 In 2014,
Missouri had ninety-three robberies at banks and financial institutions –
among the highest in the country.157 Compared to a standard robbery where
there is usually only one victim,158 the policy behind punishing bank robbery
more severely is based upon the higher number of victims present and the
increased probability a victim would be hurt or killed.

VI. CONCLUSION
The court in Brooks articulated a uniform standard to be applied when
determining whether a defendant used or threatened the immediate use of
physical force during the commission of a robbery. This decision was based
in large part on the fact that the robbery took place in a bank, and the Su-

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

18 U.S.C. § 2113 (2012).
Id. § 2113(a).
Drechsler, supra note 51, at § 2(b).
Id. at § 3.
FBI, Bank Crime Statistics, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 1, https://www.fbi.gov/statsservices/publications/bank-crime-statistics-2014/bank-crime-statistics-2014
(last
visited Jan. 10, 2015).
156. Id. at 3.
157. Id. at 6.
158. Dierker, supra note 44.
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preme Court of Missouri issued an overly lenient standard for what constitutes a threat of force that will now apply to all second-degree robbery cases.
A practical solution to the problem the court was trying to address would be
for the Missouri legislature to enact a bank robbery statute that eliminates the
force element for the crime of robbery when committed in a bank, but retain
force as an element in ordinary robbery cases.
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